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COMPELLED SUBSIDIES AND ORIGINAL MEANING 
Jud Campbell* 
"Almighty God hath created the mind free, and manifested his 
supreme will that ... to compel a man to furnish contributions 
of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves 
and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical." 
-Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom 1 
ABSTRACT 
The rule against compelled subsidization of speech is at the 
forefront of modem First Amendment disputes. Challenges to 
mandatory union dues, laws preventing discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation, and the federal "contraceptive 
mandate" have all featured variants of the anti-subsidization 
principle, reasoning that the government cannot compel people 
to support the objectionable activities of others. But the literature 
currently fails to evaluate modem compelled-subsidy doctrine in 
terms of the original meaning of the First Amendment. This 
Essay takes up that task. 
Approaching any question of original meaning requires a 
willingness to encounter a constitutional world that looks very 
different from our own. And that is especially true when it comes 
to the First Amendment. In certain contexts, some Founders 
argued that compelled subsidies violated their rights. But these 
were contested arguments. The challenge, then, is to situate 
Founding Era ideas in a historical frame that may bear little 
resemblance to modem law. Such a frame, this Essay argues, 
indicates that rights of expression and religious exercise-
undergirded by freedoms of thought and conscience-neither 
entirely excluded nor inviolably privileged arguments against 
compelled subsidies. Rather than providing determinate 
answers, the Founding-Era conception of rights encouraged 
active debate about the boundaries of governmental power. 
Compelled-subsidy doctrine thus sits in a precarious position-
within the bounds of reasonable historical argument but also 
deeply novel in its modem rigidity and judicial enforceability. 
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. The author 
thanks the editors of the First Amendment Law Review, the participants at its annual 
symposium, and the participants at the Stanford Constitutional Law Center 
Works-In-Progress Conference for helpful comments. He also thanks Andrew 
Hemby and Danny Zemel for valuable research assistance. 
1 THOMAS JEFFERSON' A BILL FOR ESTABLISIDNG RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, reprinted in 2 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545 (J. Boyd ed., 1950) (emphases omitted). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Compelled-subsidy doctrine generally prevents the 
government from forcing individuals to pay for the speech 
activities of others. The Supreme Court has held, for instance, 
that non-union employees have a First Amendment right against 
being legally obliged to fund a union's political advocacy. 2 The 
underlying logic of this principle is hardly obvious, 3 but scholars 
and judges usually frame it in terms of conscience. 4 Perhaps not 
surprising, then, concerns over compelled subsidies frequently 
come up in religious freedom debates as well. 5 
The constitutional basis for compelled-subsidy doctrine, 
however, is deeply contested. "It is simply not true," Robert Post 
insists, "that First Amendment concerns are implicated 
whenever persons are required to subsidize speech with which 
they disagree." 6 Indeed, legally compelled funding of potentially 
objectionable speech is routine. "[E]ach of us must pay taxes that 
will in part go to spread opinions many of us disbelieve and 
abhor," William Baude and Eugene Volokh point out, 
2 See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Ed. ofEduc., 431U.S.209, 235 (1977). Public employees 
now have a right against funding union bargaining activities as well. See Janus v. 
Am. Fed. of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
3 See Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1, 25-26, 35 
(2016 ); Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. 
Ass'n, 2005 SUP. CT. REv. 195, 228. 
4 See, e.g., James D. Nelson, Corporations, Unions, and the Illusion of Symmetry, 102 VA. 
L. REV. 1969, 1971 (2016 ); Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 
VA. L. REV. 317, 380-82 (2011). 
5 For example, claims bought under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a}-(b) (2012), often rely on objections to supporting the 
activities of others. See Douglas N eJ aime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: 
Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L. J. 2516, 2518-
19(2015) ("[R]eligious objections to being made complicit in the assertedly sinful 
conduct of others ... now represent an important part of courts' religious liberties 
docket."). These types of religious accommodation claims are generally no longer 
viable under the Free Exercise Clause because of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Emp't Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which held 
that individuals do not have a Free Exercise right against the enforcement of neutral, 
generally applicable laws. Drawing on a similar anti-subsidization rationale, a group 
of scholars has asserted a constitutional limit on religious accommodations that 
impose burdens on third parties. Forcing individuals to support religious-freedom 
claims of others, they argue, is a type of compelled subsidy. See Micah Schwartzman 
et al., The Costs of Conscience, 106 KY. L.J. 881, 885 (2018) ("Citizens who bear costs 
so that others may observe their faith can rightfully complain that their liberty of 
conscience has been implicated."); see also Frederick M. Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van 
Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional 
Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 379 (2014) ("Applying 
RFRA to exempt such employers from the Mandate thus violates the Establishment 
Clause prohibition of permissive accommodations that shift the material costs of 
accommodation from believers to nonadherents and other third parties."). 
6 Post, supra note 3, at 197; see also Gregory Klass, The Very Idea of a First Amendment 
Right Against Compelled Subsidization, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087 (2005); William 
Baude & Eugene Volokh, Compelled Subsidies and the First Amendment, 132 HARV. L. 
REV. 171 (2018). 
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concluding that "requiring people only to pay money, whether 
to private organizations or to the government, is not a First 
Amendment problem at all." 7 And while scholars have also 
taken the opposite view, 8 nearly everyone agrees that the 
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area is mercurial and 
undertheorized. 9 
Largely unexplored, however, is the historical basis for 
compelled-subsidy doctrine. 10 In fact, this area of law seems to 
rest almost entirely on an appeal-repeated over and over in 
Supreme Court opinions 11-to Thomas Jefferson's argument 
that "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the 
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors is sinful 
and tyrannical." 12 This reliance has led some scholars to refer to 
the rule against compelled subsidies as "the Jeffersonian 
proposition." 13 
This Essay investigates whether compelled-subsidy 
doctrine is defensible in terms of the First Amendment's original 
meaning-an inquiry of interest to nearly all interpreters. 14 In 
short, my argument is that rights of expression and religious 
7 Baude & Volokh, supra note 6, at 171. 
8 See, e.g., Schwartzman, supra note 4, at 380-82. 
9 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan & Robert C. Post, Colloquy, It's What's for Lunch: 
Nectarines, Mushrooms, and Beef-The First Amendment and Compelled Commercial 
Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 359, 365-67 (2007) (statement of Kathleen M. Sullivan 
describing "doctrinal instability and incoherence" in compelled-subsidy doctrine). 
1° For two of the most thorough explorations of the doctrine, see Klass, supra note 6, 
and Baude & Volokh, supra note 6. Neither of these works discusses Founding Era 
history, other than brief mentions of Jefferson. See Klass, supra note 6, at 1114; Baude 
& Volokh, supra note 6, at 184-85. 
11 See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed. of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 
(2018); Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 305 (1986); Abood v. Detroit Ed. of 
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 n.31 (1977); Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 790 (1961) 
(Black, J., dissenting). Jefferson's quotation is often paired with Madison's 
contemporaneous opposition to religious establishments, and particularly his 
statement: "Who does not see ... that the same authority which can force a citizen 
to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one 
establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases 
whatsoever?" JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments (1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 295, 300 (Robert 
A. Rutland et al., eds., 1973); see, e.g., Abood, 431 U.S. at234 n.31 (citing both 
Madison and Jefferson). The explicit anti-establishment focus of Madison's 
quotation may account for why the quotation is often either heavily abridged, see, 
e.g., Teachers, 475 U.S. at 305, or omitted in later speech-related opinions, see, e.g., 
Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2464; Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 572 (2005) 
(Souter, J., dissenting); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 10 (1990). 
12 JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 545. 
13 See Schwartzman, supra note 4, at 319; Steven D. Smith, Taxes, Conscience, and the 
Constitution, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 365, 374 (2006). 
14 See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 676 (1999) 
("[N]o one doing constitutional theory takes the extreme non-originalist position."); 
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1415 (1990) ("Even opponents oforiginalism 
generally agree that the historical understanding is relevant .... "). 
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exercise-undergirded by freedoms of thought and conscience-
neither entirely excluded nor inviolably privileged constitutional 
arguments against compelled subsidies. This may seem odd to 
modem readers, but the idea flows from a Founding Era 
conception of rights that was often less determinate (and less 
judicially enforceable) than how we typically view constitutional 
rights today. 15 In particular, rights at the Founding were 
generally subject to regulation in promotion of the public good, 
and the First Amendment itself "left unresolved whether certain 
restrictions . . . promoted the public good." 16 The rigidity of 
modem compelled-subsidy doctrine, by comparison, reflects a 
libertarian tum in our understanding of rights and, relatedly, a 
view of rights as more determinate, judicially enforceable limits 
on governmental power. 17 
This Essay proceeds in three Parts. It begins in Part I with 
a preliminary but important point: Compelled-subsidy doctrine's 
reliance on Jefferson is profoundly misplaced for a variety of 
methodological and historical reasons. Part II then describes 
how the Founders generally approached questions of rights, 
focusing particularly on historical understandings of natural 
rights-including the rights of conscience, religious exercise, and 
expression-and how those rights circumscribed governmental 
power. Part III shows how this general framework accounts for 
what might otherwise appear to be contradictory historical 
evidence about the constitutionality of compelled subsidies. 
Overall, the argument against compelled subsidies was 
available at the Founding, and thus in some sense can be 
understood as consistent with claims of original meaning. But it 
also was neither dispositive nor judicially cognizable. The 
Founding Era conception of rights thus leaves modem 
compelled-subsidy doctrine in a precarious position: within the 
bounds of available historical argument but also deeply novel in 
its modem rigidity and judicial enforceability. 
I. RECONSIDERING JEFFERSON 
Compelled-subsidy doctrine flows from a basic axiom of 
modem First Amendment law: the government cannot force 
15 See Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246 (2017) 
[hereinafter Campbell, Natural Rights]; Jud Campbell, Judicial Review and the 
Enumeration of Rights, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 569 (2017) [hereinafter Campbell, 
Judicial Review]; Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 3 2 
CONST. COMMENT. 85 (2017) [hereinafter Campbell, Republicanism]. 
16 Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15, at 256. 
17 See Jamal Greene, Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 35 (2018) 
("[T]he presumptive absolutism that characterizes the modern frame [for evaluating 
American constitutional rights is] an artifact of the second half of the twentieth 
century."). 
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people to express a particular view or idea. 18 Indeed, 
constitutional protections in this field are especially robust 
because, as the Supreme Court has explained, "[w]hen speech is 
compelled . . . individuals are coerced into betraying their 
convictions." 19 Compelling individuals to speak, in other words, 
may force them to violate their consciences. 2° Consequently, 
even when the government otherwise has authority to compel 
speech, the First Amendment provides a right of exemption for 
objectors. 21 Compelling a person to subsidize the speech of other 
private speakers," the Court has explained, "raises similar First 
Amendment concerns." 22 
Although it has never attempted a historical defense of 
compelled-subsidy doctrine, the Supreme Court routinely 
invokes Thomas Jefferson's famous line that "to compel a man 
to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of 
opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and 
tyrannical." 23 That reliance, this Part argues, is deeply 
problematic. It begins by explaining why Jefferson's statement 
does not support a right against compelled subsidies. The Part 
then explains how Jefferson's ideas about religious freedom were 
not widely held at the Founding and are thus an unreliable guide 
to the First Amendment's original meaning. 
A. The Fallacy of the Jeffersonian Proposition 
Compelled-subsidy doctrine's reliance on Jefferson is off 
the mark. First and foremost, Jefferson was not asserting a 
conscience-based right against compelled subsidies, and 
certainly not one enforceable as a matter of constitutional law. 
Rather, Jefferson proposed a wholesale denial of any 
governmental authority over religious matters. 24 Faithfully 
adhering to Jefferson's ideas, rather than selectively quoting one 
18 SeeW. Va. Ed. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
19 Janus v. Am. Fed. of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2488, 2464 (2018). 
20 See, e.g., Schwartzman, supra note 4, at 380-82. 
21 See Barnette, 319 at 642; see also Wooleyv. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). 
22 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464. 
23 JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 545. See, e.g., Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464, Teachers v. 
Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 305 (1986); Abood v. Detroit Ed. ofEduc., 431 U.S. 209, 234 
n.31 (1977); Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 790 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). 
24 JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 545. Mark Storslee makes a similar observation about 
James Madison's argument in the famous Memorial and Remonstrance. See Mark 
Storslee, Religious Accommodation, the Establishment Clause, and Third-Party Harm, 86 
Umv. Cm. L. REv. (forthcoming 2019) ("[Madison's] argument was not based on the 
idea that any undesired cost associated with religion should be prohibited .... Tax 
support schemes were objectionable because they effectively deprived all citizens-
those who gave to churches willingly and those who did not-of the freedom to 
'render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as [they] believe[d] to be 
acceptable to him."'). 
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line in the preamble of his proposal, would lead to a radically 
different approach to modern doctrine. 25 
But the problem is deeper. Jefferson firmly rejected the 
idea of constitutionally required religious accommodations, 
making him a perplexing (and certainly unwitting) progenitor of 
modern conscience-based rights against compelled subsidies. As 
Michael McConnell points out, "Jefferson espoused a strict 
distinction between belief, which should be protected from 
governmental control, and conduct, which should not." 26 
Jefferson was concerned about individual conscience, to be sure, 
but his approach to addressing that concern was a sweeping denial 
of governmental power over the field of religion-while 
remammg opposed to mandatory rights of religious 
accommodation. Relying on Jefferson to support a 
conscience-based right thus turns history on its head. 
Moreover, even if reliance on Jefferson were internally 
consistent, Jefferson explicitly disclaimed that his argument was 
legally binding. The Bill for Religious Freedom-effectively a 
legislative resolution-straightforwardly announced that it had 
"no effect in law." 27 Indeed, Justice Scalia emphasized this fact 
when he presented a historical case against rights of religious 
accommodation under the Free Exercise Clause. Historical 
evidence about "what was thought to be legislatively or even 
morally desireable" during the 1 780s religious freedom debates 
in Virginia, he wrote in City of Boerne v. Flores, do not necessarily 
"describe what was constitutionally required (and judicially 
enforceable)." 28 The exact same point applies to reliance on the 
Jeffersonian proposition in the context of compelled subsidies. 
It hardly needs mentioning that picking out an isolated 
statement in a preamble and then extending that statement well 
beyond its historical context is not a sound approach to 
constitutional interpretation. For instance, the preamble of the 
Bill for Religious Freedom also declares that "to suffer the civil 
magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion and to 
restrain the profession or propagation of principles on 
supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy," 29 
leading some scholars to conclude that the First Amendment's 
Speech and Press Clauses originally barred sedition 
25 Modern doctrine provides for challenges to the application of compelled subsidy 
laws against those who object to the enforcement of the laws against them. It is not a 
way of "facially" challenging the laws themselves. 
26 McConnell, supra note 14, at 1451. 
27 JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 546. 
28 521 U.S. 507, 541 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part). In this passage, Justice 
Scalia was discussing James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments, but the argument plainly applies just as much to the Bill for Religious 
Freedom. 
29 JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 546. 
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prosecutions. 30 Granted, this inference has rhetorical force 
today. 31 But it also turns out to be a fallacious way of 
understanding constitutional history. 32 And that is because the 
inference attributes far, far too much weight to a single line in the 
preamble of a single state bill that by its own terms had "no effect 
in law. " 33 
In fact, Justice Scalia is not the only proponent of 
compelled-subsidy doctrine who has nonetheless decried 
reliance on Jefferson with respect to other aspects of First 
Amendment law. "It is impossible to build sound constitutional 
doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional 
history," then-Justice Rehnquist wrote in dissent in Wallace v. 
Jaffeee, "but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been 
expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor [of a 
wall of separation between church and state] for nearly 40 
years." 34 Jeffersonian sound bites, Rehnquist implies, are not a 
reliable guide to constitutional meaning. 
Recent developments in constitutional theory reinforce 
this point. For several decades, interpreters have gravitated 
toward arguments about original meaning of the Constitution's 
words and phrases-usually in reference to a provision's legal 
meaning, public meaning, or some blend of the two-and away 
from selectively quoting the intentions of particularly revered 
Framers (or, in Jefferson's case, non-Framers). 35 On this view, 
30 See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 31 (1920). 
31 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) ("Although 
the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has 
carried the day in the court of history."). 
32 See LEONARD LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN 
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960) ("[The Framers of the First Amendment] did not 
intend to give free rein to criticism of the government that might be deemed seditious 
libel .... ");Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15. Indeed, even "Jefferson was 
quite willing to impose limitations on political expression." Michael P. Downey, 
Note, The Jeffersonian Myth in Supreme Court Sedition Jurisprudence, 7 6 WASH. U. L. Q. 
683, 685 (1998). 
33 JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 546. 
34 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Although the Supreme Court 
has previously described Jefferson, along with his political ally James Madison, as 
playing "leading roles" in the "drafting and adoption" of the First Amendment, 
Everson v. Ed. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947); Abingdon Sch. Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 234 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (describing Jefferson 
and Madison as the "architects" of the First Amendment), Rehnquist noted that 
"Jefferson was of course in France at the time the constitutional Amendments 
known as the Bill of Rights were passed by Congress and ratified by the States." 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
35 Some scholars emphasize a search for original legal meaning. See, e.g., William 
Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2355 n.16 (2015); William 
Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1131 
(2017); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language 
of the Law, 59 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1321 (2018); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a 
Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 817, 819 (2015); John F. 
Stinneford, The Original Meaning of"Cruel", 101 GEO.GEORGETOWN L. J. 441, 464 
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the views of one man-even an iconic man like Jefferson-make 
little difference. What matters, instead, is the meaning of the 
Constitution to a broader audience. 36 
Moreover, even if Jefferson's isolated statement were 
good evidence of the First Amendment's original meaning, it 
would likely undermine modem doctrine. Nowadays, First 
Amendment law strictly separates compelled subsidies for private 
speech, which are constitutionally proscribed, and compelled 
subsidies for governmental speech, which raise no First 
Amendment problem at all. 37 The latter principle is crucial given 
the ubiquity of viewpoint-based governmental speech-
supported, of course, through compulsory taxes. 38 Without 
exempting governmental speech, compelled-subsidy doctrine 
would founder. But this exemption for governmental speech has 
no grounding in the Jeffersonian proposition. To be sure, 
Jefferson was objecting to a proposed scheme that would have 
required Virginians to fund private ministers-not govemment-
run religious services. But Jefferson's objections did not tum on 
this aspect of the funding scheme. Indeed, it seems likely that 
direct governmental propagation of religious views would have 
(2017); cf Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
551 (2006) (endorsing a version of originalism that looks to original common law 
rules and common law methods). Others focus more on original public meaning. See, 
e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Cm. L. 
REV. 101, 105 (2001); Vasan Kesavan & Michael S. Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of 
the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L. J. 1113, 1120 (2003). For a 
discussion of how these inquiries can overlap, see, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, District 
of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 923, 968-70 (2009); cf 
Michael W. McConnell, Time, Institutions, and Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 1745, 
1758 (2015) ("For all of the attention given to the difference between 'original public 
meaning' originalism, and originalism based on the understandings of the framers 
and ratifiers, no one has identified nontrivial examples of actual constitutional 
interpretation that turn on the distinction."). 
36 These arguments might not be determinative on their own. Jefferson's claim, after 
all, was enshrined (with some revisions) in the Act for Establishing Religious 
Freedom-an official act of the Virginia General Assembly in 1786 that was 
reprinted in newspapers in several other states. See, e.g., PENN. PACKET (Phila.), Feb. 
2, 1786, at 3. But as this Part shows, the arguments in the Act did not reflect the 
dominant understanding of religious freedom at the time. 
37 See Schwartzman, supra note 4, at 370. For illustrations of the modern doctrine, 
see, e.g., Johanns v. LivestockMktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) ("Our 
compelled-subsidy cases have consistently respected the principle that compelled 
support of a private association is fundamentally different from compelled support of 
government. Compelled support of government-even those programs of 
government one does not approve-is of course perfectly constitutional, as every 
taxpayer must attest.") (quotation marks and alteration omitted); Ed. of Regents v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) ("The government, as a general rule, may 
support valid programs and policies by taxes or other exactions binding on protesting 
parties. Within this broader principle it seems inevitable that funds raised by the 
government will be spent for speech and other expression to advocate and defend its 
own policies."). 
38 See generally Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 5 2 B. C. L. 
REv. 695(2011) (discussing the "governmental speech" exception to general First 
Amendment principles). 
2019] COMPELLED SUBSIDIES & ORIGINAL MEANING 257 
aggravated the constitutional problem for Jefferson. Again, 
whatever the merits of modern doctrine, its apparent reliance on 
Jefferson is self-defeating. 
Scholars occasionally also point out that Jefferson was 
talking about religious freedom, and not rights of conscience more 
generally. 39 According to William Baude and Eugene Volokh, 
"Jefferson was specifically talking about the propagation of 
religious opinions, which is regulated by a separate constitutional 
provision-the Establishment Clause. "40 This critique, however, 
strikes me as less persuasive. To be sure, Jefferson was talking 
about religious freedom, and he certainly saw unique harms in 
religious dogmatism. Yet many of the ideas in his proposed Bill 
for Religious Freedom were rooted in broader freedoms of 
thought and opinion. 41 He was explicating principles of natural 
law42 and natural rights43-not a religion-focused Establishment 
Clause, which Virginia then lacked. 
In the end, however, the fact that Jefferson was relying on 
natural-rights principles, rather than a state-level ban on religious 
establishments, further undermines modern reliance on 
Jefferson. Understanding why requires a closer look at the 
actions of the First Congress when it considered whether to 
propose constitutional amendments (later known as the "Bill of 
Rights."). 44 
39 My reference here assumes that religious objections are a variant of "rights of 
conscience" more generally. Importantly, however, that was not the dominant 
linguistic practice at the Founding, see McConnell, supra note 14, at 1483-84 (noting 
the interchangeable usage of "liberty of conscience" and "free exercise of religion" at 
the Founding), and even today rights of "conscience" can be defined in various 
ways, see Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and Religion, 2013 U. ILL. L. 
REv. 1457, 1489-94 (discussing other definitions of"conscience"). 
40 Baude & Volokh, supra note 6, at 184-85 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); 
see also Klass, supra note 6, at 1114 ("Jefferson's statement ... concerns only the 
compelled subsidization of religious activities .... ");cf Schwartzman, supra note 4, 
at 323 n.13 (arguing that Jefferson's point, though made in the context of religious 
assessments, is not properly limited to that context). 
41 See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OFVIRGINlA 159 (William 
Peden ed., 1955). 
42 That is, the dictates of reason-notwithstanding the fact that Jefferson couched 
these ideas in terms of divine will. 
43 JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 546--47 ("[T]he rights hereby asserted, are of the 
natural rights of mankind."). Jefferson was drawing on a long tradition of 
philosophers who viewed the right to religious belief as inalienable. See, e.g., FRANCIS 
HUTCHESON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINAL OF OUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY AND 
VIRTUE: IN Two TREATISES 185 (Knud Haakonssen ed., Liberty Fund Inc. 2004) 
(1726); JOHN LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, reprinted in Two TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 246 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003) 
(arguing from natural-rights principles that "nobody ought to be compelled in 
matters of religion either by law or force"); JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING 
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 82 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (1690) ("[I]n bare naked 
Perception the Mind is, for the most part, only passive; and what it perceives, it cannot 
avoid perceiving.") (emphasis in original). 
44 See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, THE HEART OF THE CONSTITUTION: How THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS BECAME THE BILL OF RIGHTS 5 (2018). 
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B. The Idiosyncracy of Jefferson 
By the time Congress proposed the amendments in 1789, 
Americans had articulated two competiting views about the 
relationship between the inalienable right of conscience and 
various aspects of religious establishments, including religious 
assessments. The dominant view seems to have been that 
religious establishments did not necessarily violate rights of 
conscience. 45 Indeed, state constitutions generally treated rights 
of conscience (or free exercise) distinctly from their allowance or 
disallowance of religious establishments. 46 But a competing 
approach to religious freedom-championed most famously by 
Jefferson and Madison in their fight against religious assessments 
in Virginia-saw a fundamental opposition between conscience 
rights and religious assessment schemes. So which of these 
understandings of religious freedom prevailed when Congress 
debated and passed the First Amendment? 
Debates and votes in the House of Representatives (our 
only direct source of evidence47) comport with the view that 
rights of conscience were not inherently incompatible with 
religious establishments. In other words, Jefferson's arguments 
in the Bill for Religious Freedom apparently did not shape how 
the members of the First Congress thought about religious 
freedom. 48 Evidence demonstrating this point begins with the 
structure of Madison's initial proposal. 
When Madison proposed amendments on June 8, 1789, 
he insisted on adding protection for the natural rights of 
expressive freedom and religious conscience against the federal 
and state governments alike. 49 Madison's proposed Establishment 
45 My point here is, of course, not that any state establishment scheme would 
necessarily comport with free exercise. One can imagine an obvious violation offree-
exercise rights if a state forced everyone to worship at a particular church. Rather, 
my point is that the dominant understanding of free exercise rights was not 
inherently incompatible with more tolerant forms of religious establishments-
contrary to Jefferson's innovative argument in the mid-l 780s. See Philip A. 
Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate about Equal Protection 
and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 353 (noting the innovative nature of 
Jefferson's position). 
46 See Wesley J. Campbell, Religious Neutrality in the Early Republic, 24 REGENT U. L. 
REV. 311, 323 [hereinafter Campbell, Religious Neutrality] ("[Establishment-related] 
provisions ... were often in separate sections and generally did not affect the scope 
of free exercise protections."). 
47 Because the Senate proceedings were closed to the public, records of Senate 
debates (with rare exception) do not exist. 
48 My methodology is a comparison of the logic of the Jeffersonian argument to the 
logic of the various proposals and arguments considered in the First Congress. For a 
different methodology, arguing more broadly that Jefferson's Bill for Religious 
Freedom had very little influence on the Founders, see Mark David Hall, Madison's 
Memorial and Remonstrance and Jefferson's Statute for Religious Liberty, and the Creation of 
the First Amendment, 3 AM. POL. THOUGHT 32(2014). 
49 See 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791: 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES IO (Charlene B. Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., Johns 
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Clause, by contrast, banned only the creation of "any national 
religion," 50 without a comparable limit on state authority. Thus, 
although Madison wanted speech and press freedoms and the 
"equal rights of conscience" to be protected in the federal 
Constitution against both federal and state action, only the federal 
government would be federally barred from creating an 
established church. 
Madison's proposal reveals a simple but crucial point: 
Contrary to Jefferson's arguments in the Bill for Religious 
Freedom, the natural rights of expressive freedom and religious 
conscience did not necessarily ban religious establishments. 
Otherwise, the language of Madison's proposed amendments 
made no sense: for one thing, the Establishment Clause would 
have been superfluous (since a recognition of the inalienable 
right of conscience would already have deprived the government 
of authority to establish a religion), and for another, the 
Establishment Clause's apparent limitation to the federal 
government would have been unjustified, so long as states were 
also federally bound to respect rights of conscience. "It is indeed 
stressing the obvious," Joseph Snee concludes, "that, in 
[Madison's] mind at least, ... the establishment of a religion by 
law is not per se an infringement of the equal rights of 
conscience." 51 
Madison's colleagues apparently agreed. Although the 
House of Representatives revised his language, it kept the basic 
substance and structure of the initial proposal: Protection of 
expressive and religious freedom against the federal and state 
governments, coupled with an anti-establishment rule to limit 
Hopkins Univ. Press 1986) ("The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of 
religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall 
the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on an pretext infringed. 
The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to 
publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of 
liberty, shall be inviolable."); id. at 11 ("No state shall violate the equal rights of 
conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases."). For a 
more thorough presentation of the drafting history of the First Amendment, see 
Vincent Phillip Mufioz, The Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence 
from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1083, 1102-09 (2008). For 
identification of religious and expressive freedom as natural rights, see, e.g., James 
Madison, Notes for Speech in Congress (June 8, 1789), in 12 THE PAPE RS OF JAMES 
MADISON 193, 194 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979) ("[N]atural 
rights, retained-as Speech, Con[ science]"); Proposal by Roger Sherman to House 
Committee of Eleven (July 21-28, 1789), in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE 
DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 83-84 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) 
(" [C]ertain natural rights which are retained" include the "right[] of conscience" and 
the right" of Speaking, writing and publishing ... with decency and freedom."). See 
generally, Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15. 
50 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 49' at 10 
(emphasis added). 
51 Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 
WASH. U. L. Q. 371, 384. 
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only federal power. 52 Nobody so much as hinted that the 
extension of religious and expressive freedom rights against state 
governments might threaten state religious establishments, 
notwithstanding the fact that Jefferson's prior arguments against 
religious assessments proceeded explicitly from natural-rights 
principles. 53 In other words, nobody in the House of 
Representatives seems to have interpreted Madison's 1789 
proposal in light of Jefferson's arguments several years earlier. 
Nor is it likely that members of the House of 
Representatives simply overlooked such a startling implication 
for state religious establishments. Madison's colleagues were 
acutely aware of the political need to protect state religious 
establishments. In debates over the proposed amendments, 
Representatives Peter Silvester of New York and Benjamin 
Huntington of Connecticut each voiced concerns that the 
proposed language-"no religion shall be established by law"-
would be misconstrued in ways that might obstruct the operation 
of state religious establishments. 54 It went without saying that 
entirely dismantling state religious establishments was a 
complete non-starter. 55 Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire 
then suggested language that carried the day: "[C]ongress shall 
make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of 
conscience." 56 With that change, representatives apparently 
52 Their proposed third and fourth amendments read: "The Third. Congress shall 
make no law establishing religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall 
the rights of Conscience be infringed. The Fourth. The Freedom of Speech and of the 
Press ... shall not be infringed." 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL 
CONGRESS, supra note 49, at 36. Meanwhile, the proposed fourteenth amendment 
read: "No State shall infringe ... the rights of conscience, nor the freedom of speech, 
or of the press." Id. at 39. 
53 For debates in the House of Representatives over the Establishment Clause, see 11 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS: DEBATES IN THE HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES: FIRST SESSION, JUNE-SEPTEMBER 1789 1254, 1257, 1260-62 
(Charlene B. Bickford et al. eds., John Hopkins Univ. Press 1992). 
54 Id. at 1260 (Silvester); id. at 1261-62 (Huntington). 
55 See Mufioz, supra note 49, at 1104 ("Proposing an amendment to apply against the 
states was audacious in itself; an amendment that would have made a widespread 
state practice immediately unconstitutional probably would not have had any chance 
of being ratified."). Munoz's qualifier "probably" is unnecessary. 
56 Id. at 1262. To be clear, I am not attempting to explicate the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause, or, particularly, whether it permits or forbids governmental 
support of religion. One scholar has proposed that "limitations [in state 
constitutions] on religious establishments imposed a prohibition beyond or different 
from taxpayer funding of religion." Vincent Philip Mufioz, Church and State in the 
Founding-Era State Constitutions, 4 AM. POL. THOUGHT 1, 26 (2015). This Essay does 
not enter that debate. Rather, my point is that the recognition of the natural rights of 
religious and expressive freedom (as the House of Representatives proposed to 
extend against state governments) did not of their own force forbid state measures, 
like religious assessments, that Jefferson and Madison had previously argued were 
categorically incompatible with the inalienable right of conscience. In other words, 
the First Congress's decision to extend rights of religious and expressive freedom 
against state governments, combined with the First Congress's desire not to disturb 
existing state laws (like religious assessment schemes in New England), demonstrates 
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thought that state religious establishments were sufficiently 
guarded against federal interference. And when it came time to 
debate the proposal to protect religious and expressive freedom 
against state infringement, nobody said anything that suggested 
any threat to state establishments of religion. 57 
Of course, the Senate ended up deciding not to endorse 
the House's proposed amendment that would have limited state 
governments. 58 But we do not know why. 59 Senate records from 
this period are sparse. The only recorded opposition to the 
amendment came in the House of Representatives when Thomas 
Tudor Tucker of South Carolina objected that "[i]t will be much 
better ... to leave the state governments to themselves, and not 
to interfere with them more than we already do." 60 He never 
suggested that the amendment would have had any particular 
impact on state religious establishments. 
Of course, none of this is to deny the historical 
importance of the Bill for Religious Freedom to the broader 
cause of disestablishment. But records from the House of 
Representatives indicate that Jefferson's earlier arguments were 
not on the minds of the framers of the First Amendment. 
In sum, the Supreme Court's myopic reliance on the 
Jeffersonian proposition as a guide to the First Amendment's 
original meaning is profoundly flawed. But debunking this 
historical mythology does not prove that compelled subsidies are 
consistent with the original meaning of the First Amendment. 
Far from it. For that inquiry, we must step back into the 
eighteenth century and try to comprehend the meaning of the 
First Amendment in its own time. 
that those rights had a more limited reach than what Jefferson and Madison had 
previously argued in Virginia. Whether religious assessments constituted an 
"establishment" of religion makes no difference for purposes of this Essay. 
57 CONG. REG. [Philadelphia], Aug. 17, 1789, reprinted in I I DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 53, at 1291-92. 
58 See 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 49' at 
39 n.19. 
59 See Mufioz, supra note 49, at 1108 ("No reason [for the Senate's rejection of the 
amendment] was recorded, though given that Senators at the time were elected by 
state legislatures, it may be that the Senate thought it improper to adopt an 
amendment applied against the States."). Interestingly, Justice Brennan posited that 
the "amendment was defeated in the Senate by the forces Madison feared most, 
those who wanted the states to retain their systems of established churches." William 
J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as 
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 537 (1986). Brennan, however, 
seems to have mistakenly relied on a source that said nothing of the sort. See IRVING 
BRANT, JAMES MADISON, THE FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 271 (1950) (discussing 
the Senate's rejection of a state-restraining amendment). 
6° CONG. REG. [Philadelphia], Aug. 17, 1789, reprinted in I I DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 53, 1292. 
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II. NATIJRAL RIGHTS AT TIIE FOUNDING 
The key to a historical understanding of the First 
Amendment-as I have argued elsewhere and summarize in this 
Part-is to step back from a search for the meaning of particular 
rights and instead try to appreciate how the Founders thought 
about rights more generally. 61 Indeed, the Founders thought very 
differently about rights than we do today. 
For most Americans now, a constitutional "right" is a 
legally enforceable privilege or immunity-something that the 
government has to provide us (e.g., our "right" to a jury trial) or 
something that the government cannot take away (e.g., our 
"right" to possess personal firearms for self-defense). 62 But 
American elites in the late eighteenth century understood their 
"rights" differently. For the Founders, rights were divided into 
two categories: natural rights and positive rights. And unless we 
approach the task of constitutional interpretation on their terms 
rather than on ours, the First Amendment's original meaning 
will remain elusive. 
Natural rights were all the things that we could do simply 
as humans, without the intervention of a government. As 
Thomas Paine once put it, "[a] natural right is an animal right, 
and the power to act it, is supposed . . . to be mechanically 
contained within ourselves as individuals. " 63 Eating, walking, 
thinking, and praying, for instance, were all things that 
individuals could do without a government, so they were all 
natural rights. Meanwhile, positive rights were defined explicitly 
in terms governmental authority. 64 The rights to a jury trial and 
to habeas corpus, for instance, were positive rights because they 
were procedures provided by the government. 
61 What follows in this Part is mostly derivative of my earlier work, and the text is 
based on a short summary of that work in Jud Campbell, What Did the First 
Amendment Originally Mean?, RICH. L. MAG. (2018). The innovative moves in this 
Essay are limited to Parts I and III. 
62 See Richard H. Pildes, Dworkin's Two Conceptions of Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 
311 (2000) ("I believe [a view of rights as 'trumps'] is the dominant view of rights in 
the contemporary political culture (though I do not know how one would prove 
that)."). Pildes nonetheless argues that this common conception of rights 
inaccurately describes modern rights jurisprudence, see Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights 
Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 2 7 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 725, 729 (1998) ("Rights are not general trumps against appeals to the 
common good or anything else; instead, they are better understood as channeling the 
kinds of reasons government can invoke when it acts in certain arenas."). I largely 
agree. See Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15, at 315-16. 
63 THOMAS P AlNE, Candid and Critical Remarks on Letter 1, Signed Ludlow, PA. J. & 
WKLY ADVERTISER, June 4, 1777, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS PAlNE 274 (Philips. Forrer ed., Citadel Press 1945). 
64 The notion of "positive" rights, then, is contrasted with "natural" rights. It does 
not refer to the common distinction between "positive" and "negative" rights. 
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With these definitions in view, the Founders had no need 
to write out long lists of which types of rights were natural and 
which were positive. The distinction, to them, was obvious. 
Thinking, believing, speaking, writing, publishing, and 
worshiping, for instance, were all things that people could do 
without a government, so they were readily recognizable as 
natural rights. When James Madison introduced amendments in 
the first Congress, for instance, he only mentioned in passing that 
the freedoms of speech and conscience were among the "natural 
rights, retained." 65 Madison's audience easily understood his 
point. Expression and religious belief are innate human 
capacities, so they are clearly natural rights. 
We still have not quite arrived at the original meaning of 
the First Amendment. For that, we need to understand how 
natural rights constrained governmental power. Surely the First 
Amendment imposes some limits on Congress. (It starts, after 
all, with "Congress shall make no law .... ")66 What were those 
limits? 
For the Founders, natural rights were rooted in a 
philosophical system called social-contract theory. 67 According 
to this theory, the proper scope of governmental authority is 
discoverable by first imagining our situation as if there were no 
government and then considering why we would come together 
and agree to form a political society through an agreement 
known as a social contract (or "social compact"). 68 The political 
society would then agree to a constitution that created a 
government and granted it certain powers. 
Although some ancillary features of social-contract 
theory were contested, virtually every American political leader 
in the late 18th century agreed about its core features. 69 Most 
importantly, the Founders recognized two crucial limitations 
that social-contract theory imposed on governmental power to 
restrict natural rights. 7° First, natural rights could be restricted 
only when the people themselves consented to the restriction, 
either in person or through their political representatives. 71 This 
principle was a rallying cry for American colonists advocating 
65 James Madison, Notes for Speech in Congress (June 8, 1789), in 12 THE PAPE RS 
OF JAMES MADISON 193, 194 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979) (italics omitted). 
66 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
67 Campbell, Republicanism, supra note 15, at 87-88. 
68 Id. at 88-89. The term "social compact" is more historical, but it is avoided in this 
Essay to prevent confusion with the separate notion of "compact" frequently invoked 
in historical debates over the nature of the federal union. 
69 Id. at 98 (" [A]lthough American elites spoke in radically different ways ... they 
widely agreed on the substance-that retained natural rights could be regulated in the 
public interest by the people or their representatives."). 
70 Id. at 92-93. 
71 Id. at 92-93, 97-98. 
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for independence rather than submitting to British taxation when 
they had no representation in parliament. 72 Second, the 
government could restrict natural rights only when doing so 
promoted the public good-that is, the aggregate happiness and 
welfare of the entire political society. 73 Individuals entering a 
political society, John Locke explained in his widely read Second 
Treatise, surrender "as much ... natural Liberty ... as the Good, 
Prosperity, and Safety of the Society shall require. "74 
As a general matter, therefore, the concept of natural 
rights helped define who could restrict individual liberty (i.e., a 
representative legislature) and why they could do so (i.e., to 
promote the public good). But natural rights were not a set of 
determinate legal privileges or immunities that the government 
could not abridge. Natural rights, it bears emphasis, could be 
restricted by law to promote the good of the society. "[T]he right 
to speak and act," American patriot James Otis explained at the 
onset of the colonial conflict, "is limited by the law-Political 
liberty consists in a freedom of speech and action, so far as the 
laws of a community will permit, and no farther." 75 Effectively, 
this put the legislature-not judges-in primary control over 
how far to restrict expression and how far to extend rights of 
religious freedom. The idea of natural rights, in other words, was 
primarily philosophical, not legal. 
At the same time, the Founders also appreciated that 
certain regulations of expression and religious exercise were not 
in the public interest and were therefore beyond the scope of 
legislative power. 76 The famous "rule against prior restraints"-
prohibiting the government from requiring pre-approval of 
publications-is one example in the context of expression. 77 
Another is that well-intentioned criticisms of the government 
could not be punished. 78 (Deliberate efforts to mislead the public 
were an entirely different matter.) Meanwhile, the Founders 
widely agreed the government could not punish individuals or 
deprive them of basic civil privileges on the basis of their religious 
72 Id. at 98. 
73 Id. at 93-94. 
74 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT§ 130 (1690), reprinted in Two 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 156 (Ian 
Shapiro ed., 2003). 
75 Freeborn American, Bos. GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., Mar. 9, 1767, reprinted 
in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO 95, 95 (Leonard w. Levy ed., 1996). 
76 Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15, at 291 ("Governmental powers recognized 
at common law were presumptively acceptable, while common-law limits on those 
powers (such as the rule against prior restraints) recognized presumptively unjustified 
abridgments of natural rights."). 
77 Id. at 289-90. 
78 Id. at 280-87. 
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views. 79 The First Amendment thus prevented temporary 
legislative majorities from abandoning these settled principles. 
How much further the First Amendment went, though, 
was up for debate precisely because the Founders often disagreed 
about exactly what restrictions of expression promoted the public 
good. This conflict was especially clear in the late 1 790s as 
Americans clashed over the constitutionality of the federal 
Sedition Act. 
Members of the Federalist Party-the party of President 
John Adams-argued that maintaining a republican government 
required punishing those who falsely and maliciously criticized 
the government. 80 "[E]very individual is at liberty to expose, in 
the strongest terms, consistent with decency and truth all the 
errors of any department of the government," Federalist jurist 
Alexander Addison wrote. 81 But this hardly implied 
constitutional protection for deliberately misleading the public. 
"Because the Constitution guaranties the right of expressing our 
opinions, and the freedom of the press," Federalist congressman 
John Allen asked rhetorically, "am I at liberty to falsely call you 
a thief, a murderer, an atheist?" 82 Stopping the spread of lies, 
Federalists insisted, was essential to maintaining a well-informed 
electorate and, thus, a republican government. 
In response, Jeffersonian-Republican opponents of the 
Sedition Act did not even try to defend the notion that all speech 
is beneficial. "It may perhaps be urged, and plausibly urged, that 
the welfare of the community may sometimes, and in some 
cases, require certain restrictions on [an] unlimited right of 
enquiry," Elizabeth Ryland Priestley admitted. 83 The problem 
for Republicans, however, was the prospect of governmental 
abuses of power. Authority to punish sedition, Priestley 
explained, "once conceded, may be extended to every [opinion] 
which insidious despotism may think fit to hold out as 
dangerous." 84 In other words, Republicans still assessed 
questions of free speech in terms of the public good, but they 
worried that Federalists were pursuing their own narrow partisan 
79 My point here is not to make any effort to settle the precise boundaries of this 
right. Rather, it is indisputable that Americans widely accepted basic principles of 
religious freedom embodied in, for instance, the Toleration Act. 1 W. & M., ch. 18. 
8° Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15, at 283. 
81 ALEXANDER ADDISON, ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE 
VIRGINIA ASSEMBLY, ON THE PROCEEDINGS OF SUNDRY OF THE OTHER STATES IN 
ANSWER TO THEIR RESOLUTIONS 42 (Philadelphia, Zachariah Poulson, Jr. 1800). 
82 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2097 (1798) (statement of Rep. John Allen). 
83 Elizabeth Priestley, On the Propriety and Expediency of Unlimited Enquiry, in THOMAS 
COOPER, POLITICAL ESSAYS 62, 63 (Philadelphia, Thomas Cooper ed., 2d ed. 1800). 
84 Id. at 63-64. 
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interests rather than the general welfare and that these abuses of 
power would stifle useful public debate. 85 
In sum, the founders thought the First Amendment 
required Congress to infringe expressive and religious freedom 
only in promotion of the public good, while also guaranteeing 
more specific legal rules that had long protected these rights. The 
Amendment, in other words, stood for a general principle-one 
that left room for considerable debate about how it should be 
applied in practice-and also for the entrenchment of more 
specific settled rules. The First Amendment thus shaped debate 
about expressive and religious freedom while also standing as a 
bulwark against constitutional backsliding. The Amendment 
was not simply a counter-majoritarian limit on legislative power. 
However, once the people agreed on core principles, the 
legislature could not turn back. 
This process of accumulating and refining constitutional 
limits over time through political means is mostly foreign to 
Americans today. Rights in the modern sense are counter-
majoritarian constraints on legislative power, so it seems strange 
that their scope could somehow depend on political decisions. 
For modern Americans, judges have that job. 86 
For people born and raised in the tradition of the 
customary British constitution, however, the logic ofrecognizing 
constitutional limits through political rather than judicial means 
made perfect sense. "A customary law carries with it the most 
unquestionable proofs of freedom," explained James Wilson, a 
delegate to the Constitutional Convention and later a Supreme 
Court justice. 87 Politicians do abuse power, of course. But for the 
Founders, once legislators-acting on behalf of the people-
agreed on a constitutional principle, and once that settlement 
remained in place for considerable time, the principle became 
binding. 88 "[L] ong and uniform custom," English jurist Richard 
Wooddeson noted in 1792, "bestows a sanction, as evidence of 
universal approbation and acquiescence." 89 It was, in other 
words, as if the people themselves had spoken. 
The First Amendment fit within this familiar tradition. 
Well-established principles about expressive and religious 
85 For more detailed analysis of Republic concerns, emphasizing Republican fears of 
political bias in the enforcement of a Sedition Act, see Jud Campbell, The Invention of 
First Amendment Federalism, 97 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2019). 
86 See generally Greene, supra note 17 (assessing American views of rights, including 
the development of those views). 
87 JAMES WILSON, Municipal Law, reprinted in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES 
WILSON 549, 569 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007). 
88 Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15, at 290-92. 
89 RICHARD W OODDESON, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE: TREATED OF IN THE 
PRELIMINARY PART OF A COURSE OF LECTURES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 46 
(London, T. Payne & Son 1783). 
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freedom would limit Congress, and judges and juries could 
enforce those settled boundaries of governmental authority. But 
otherwise the First Amendment would leave the task of defining 
the public good to the people and their representatives. For the 
founders, judges could not create new limits on governmental 
authority. 90 
ill. COMPELLED SUBSIDIES 
This Part considers historical evidence regarding 
compelled subsidies in light of the general framework just laid 
out. My argument is that Founding Era rights of expression and 
religious exercise-undergirded by freedoms of thought and 
conscience-neither entirely excluded nor inviolably privileged 
constitutional arguments against compelled subsidies. This Part 
begins by applying the theory in Part II to the problem of 
compelled subsidies. Next, it shows how that theory maps onto 
available historical evidence. 
A. Applying a Natural Rights Framework 
From the standpoint of social-contract theory, compelled 
subsidies plainly infringe natural liberty. Forcing someone to do 
something-particularly something that itself does not violate 
the natural rights of others-clearly implicates the general 
principle that the government may not restrict natural liberty 
unless doing so promotes the public good. 
Indeed, the expansive breadth of natural rights meant that 
the Founders had no need to engage in the extensive 
categorization efforts that abound in modern rights 
jurisprudence-defining, for instance, what activities count as 
"speech" or what activities count as "religious. "91 This is not to 
say that inquiries of this sort were necessarily irrelevant at the 
Founding. People back then, for example, could invoke natural-
rights premises to argue that government had authority over non-
religious issues but not over religious concerns. 92 But this was 
merely an argument-and one that relied on a series of 
contestable premises and conclusions about the effects of 
9° For discussions of the limited nature of Founding Era judicial review, see LARRY 
D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDIClALREVlEW (2004); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American 
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 140--42 (1893); Christopher R. 
Green, Clarity and Reasonable Doubt in Early State-Constitutional Judicial Review, 57 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 169, 172-83 (2015); John McGinnis, The Duty of Clarity, 84 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 843, 880-904 (2016). 
91 Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15, at 287 n.188; see also Greene, supra note 17, 
at 38 (noting how, under the modern approach to rights, "analysis is weighted 
toward threshold interpretive questions"). 
92 See, e.g., MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 11. 
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governmental power vis-a-vis religion. Someone else might just 
as easily argue using entirely different categories-perhaps a 
narrower category (e.g., non-harmful religious views) or a broader 
one (e.g., thoughts). In other words, terms like "speech" and 
"religion" were not references to fixed categories of natural rights 
with clearly delineated boundaries. 93 Nor did the First 
Amendment suggest anything of the sort. (If it had, the Ninth 
Amendment would have immediately dispelled that 
suggestion.)94 In this sense, a constitutionally grounded 
argument against compelled subsidization was readily available 
at the Founding-either under the First Amendment or under 
general principles of social-contract theory. 
Nonetheless, this threshold inquiry about the scope of 
rights was far less significant back then for the simple reason that 
the public good took priority. Forcing individuals to subsidize 
objectionable activities-whether related to speech, religion, or 
anything else-did not necessarily violate fundamental law. To 
be sure, any compelled subsidy-whether in the form of taxes, 
personal services, or otherwise-implicated the general principles 
of social contract theory, but compelled subsidies were not 
therefore categorically disallowed. Consequently, the Founders 
had no need to analyze whether compelled subsidies for speech 
operated as abridgments of "speech" within the meaning of the 
First Amendment. 95 Outside the more determinate limits on 
governmental authority set by fundamental positive rights, 96 
natural rights of all sorts-speech-related or not-enjoyed the 
same basic protections under fundamental law. 
Natural rights at the Founding thus did not impose fixed 
limits on governmental power to compel people to tum over 
money or resources. In their famous protests against taxation 
without representation, for instance, the American colonists 
invoked their "unalienable" natural right of property, 97 but this 
93 See Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15, at 269-70 (noting the fluidity of 
terminology and categories). 
94 U.S. CONST. amend IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."); see 
Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15, at 307. As argued elsewhere, the 
enumeration of retained natural rights in the text of a constitution or bill of rights had 
no effect on the judicial enforceability of those rights. See Jud Campbell, Judicial 
Review, supra note 15, at 572-76. The same thing was not necessarily true of positive 
rights. See id. at 577 ("By the late 1780s, however, enumerating rights was not always 
just a declaratory exercise. Constitutional enumeration also had come to provide an 
avenue for recognizing the fundamentality of positive rights not supported by 
custom."). 
95 Cf Baude & Volokh, supra note 6, at 172-94 (extensively analyzing whether being 
compelled to give money that is used for speech is an abridgment of "speech" within 
the meaning of the First Amendment). 
96 See Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15; see discussion, supra note 79, and 
accompanying text. 
97 See Campbell, Republicanism, supra note 15, at 98. 
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argument hardly suggested a general protest against any 
governmental authority to tax, nor did it suggest any exemption 
from taxes based on conscientious objections. Rather, the taxing 
authority was circumscribed by axioms of social-contract theory, 
which required representative consent and pursuit of the public 
good. 98 The same principles straightforwardly applied to any 
other compulsory payments. 
B. Compelled Subsidies at the Founding 
So far, this Part has proceeded deductively-taking the 
framework outlined in Part II and applying it to the problem of 
compelled subsidies. A more inductive approach, focused on 
how particular Founders viewed the constitutionality of 
compelled subsidies for speech, is not feasible for the simple 
reason that no such controversies are known. But, debates over 
legally compelled payments did arise with respect to another 
natural right mentioned in the First Amendment: free exercise. 
Evidence from religious-freedom disputes reinforces that 
compelled subsidies could implicate natural-rights concerns. At 
the same time, however, recorded debates indicate that these 
natural rights against compelled subsidization were subject to 
legislative regulation, without any suggestion of judicial 
oversight. 99 
This Part focuses on two sources of evidence: First, 
debates in the First Congress over whether those who religiously 
objected to bearing arms should have to make an "equivalent" 
payment in lieu of militia service, and, second, religious-
assessment provisions in various state laws and constitutions. 
1. "Equivalents" 
As the First Congress convened in 1 789, several state 
constitutions or declarations of rights accommodated individuals 
who religiously objected to militia service. But there was often a 
catch. As New Hampshire's 1783 constitution put it, "No person 
who is conscientiously scrupulous about the lawfulness of 
bearing arms, shall be compelled thereto, provided he will pay an 
equivalent." 100 Several other states had comparable provisions, 101 
9s Id. 
99 Outside ofthis particular context, some early commentators endorsed a judicial 
check on extreme abuses oflegislative authority, where there was manifest disregard 
for the public good. See Campbell, Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 573-74. 
lOO N.H. CONST. of 1783, Part I, art. XIII, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 
277 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015) (emphasis added). 
101 See, e.g., N. Y. CONST. of 1777, § XL, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 
277 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015) ("That all such of the Inhabitants of this State, 
being of the People called Quakers, as from Scruples of Conscience may be averse to 
the bearing of Arms, be therefrom excused by the Legislature; and do pay to the 
State such Sums of Money in Lieu of their personal Service, as the same may, in the 
270 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol.17 
and when the ratifying conventions in Virginia, North Carolina, 
and Rhode Island met, they each recommended a federal 
constitutional amendment providing "[t]hat any person 
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted, 
upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his 
stead." 102 (This practice was also known as paying for a 
"substitute.") 
Madison responded to these proposals by including in his 
original draft of the Second Amendment a concluding provision 
that "no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be 
compelled to render military service in person." 103 Notably, 
Madison's proposal-unlike those submitted by Virginia, North 
Carolina, and Rhode Island-seemed to make the issue of 
equivalents a matter of legislative discretion, not constitutional 
command. 104 The committee that initially revised Madison's 
proposals reported-perhaps at the behest of Roger Sherman of 
Connecticut105-a slightly different version, potentially 
broadening the scope of the accommodation: "no person 
religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms." 106 
The removal of "in person" from Madison's initial 
proposal did not go unnoticed. When the amendment came up 
for debate in the full house, James Jackson of Georgia "moved 
to amend the clause, by inserting at the end of it 'upon paying an 
equivalent to be established by law."' 107 Conscientious objectors, 
in other words, would have to compensate the government for 
their refusal to bear arms. 
Judgment of the Legislature, be worth."); PENN. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of 
Rights, §VIII, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 585 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d 
ed. 2015) ("That ever member of society hath a right to be protected in the 
enjoyment oflife, liberty and property, and therefore is bound to contribute his 
proportion towards the expence of that protection, and yield his personal service 
when necessary, or an equivalent thereto: But no part of a man's property can be 
justly taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of 
his legal representatives: Nor can any man who is conscientiously scrupulous of 
bearing arms, be justly compelled thereto, ifhe will pay such equivalent; nor are the 
people bound by any laws, but such as they have in like maner assented to, for their 
common good."). Delaware had an equivalent provision to Pennsylvania's. See 
Delaware Declaration of Rights of 1776, § 10. 
102 See Mufioz, supra note 49, at 1111 (emphases added) (citing 5 THE FOUNDERS' 
CONSTITUTION 16, 18 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
103 CONG. REG. [Philadelphia], Aug. 17, 1789, reprinted in I I DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 53, 1285. 
104 See McConnell, supra note 14, at 1500. 
105 The removal of "in person" also appears in a committee draft attributed to Roger 
Sherman, see THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 264 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015), and 
as noted below, Sherman was a leading opponent of requiring Quakers to pay an 
equivalent. 
106 House Comm. of Eleven Report (July 28, 1789), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 264 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015). 
107 CONG. REG. [Philadelphia], Aug. 17, 1789, reprinted in I I DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 53, at 1286. 
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Jacksons' s proposal impliciated the problem of compelled 
subsidies. Many Quakers, after all, did not simply object to 
bearing arms in person. They were, as Roger Sherman quickly 
pointed out, "equally scrupulous of getting subsitutes or paying 
an equivalent; many of them would rather die than do either one 
or the other." 108 John Vining of Delaware echoed this claim. 109 
To be sure, the funds were not to be used for speech or religious 
exercise. But they do implicate the conscience-based logic of 
modem compelled-subsidy doctrine. As Sherman and Vining 
emphasized, Quakers conscientiously objected to paying an 
equivalent because of the way that the funds would be used. 110 
From the standpoint of natural rights, however, such 
accommodations-although preferable, when possible-were 
not absolutely required. "No man can claim this indulgence of 
right," Egbert Benson of New York insisted, arguing against a 
specific, constitutionally ossified protection for religious 
dissenters. 111 A few days later, Thomas Scott of Pennsylvania 
echoed Benson's point. Recognizing a right against being 
compelled to bear arms, Scott argued, would also bar the 
government from collecting "an equivalent." He was not against 
such a right as an "indulgence by law." But Scott stressed the 
countervailing challenges of administering an accommodation 
regime, the importance of maintaining viable militias, and 
concerns that atheists might take advantage of the law to avoid 
militia service. Consequently, Scott "conceive[d] it is a matter of 
legislative right altogether"-not the sort of thing that ought to 
be enumerated in the Constitution. 112 
108 Id. at 1286-87. 
109 Id. at 1287 ("[He] hoped the clause would be suffered to remain as it stood, 
because he saw no use in it ifit was amended so as to compel a man to find a 
substitute, which, with respect to the government, was the same as ifthe person 
himself turned out to fight."). For purposes ofthis paper, what matters is the 
perception of Quaker beliefs among members of the First Congress-not the actual 
beliefs. On that issue, there is some debate about the extent to which Quakers and 
others objected to the payments of equivalents. See Philip Hamburger, Religious 
Freedom in Philadelphia, 54 EMORY L.J. 1603, 1606 n.6 (2005). 
110 See House Comm. of Eleven Report (July 28, 1789), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL 
OF RIGHTS 264 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015); CONG. REG. [Philadelphia], Aug. 17, 
1789' reprinted in 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 
supra note 53, at 1286. 
111 CONG. REG. [Philadelphia], Aug. 17, 1789, reprinted in 11 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 53, at 1287. Benson's 
reference to "right" in a non-discretionary sense indicates that he was referring to the 
lack of any determinate legal immunity (i.e., a fundamental positive right); he was 
not, on my reading, saying anything about natural rights, except by implication 
denying that those rights translated in this context into determinate legal immunities. 
See Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15 (distinguishing between natural rights and 
fundamental positive rights). 
112 GAZETTE OF THE U.S. (Phila.), Aug. 22, 1789, reprinted in 11 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 53, at 1308-09. 
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Elias Boudinot of New Jersey then defended the proposed 
accommodation regime, emphasizing practical and ethical 
problems with forcing individuals to violate their consciences. 
"What dependence can be placed in men who are conscientious 
in this respect?" he asked, noting that "[i]n forming a militia we 
ought to calculate for an effectual defence, and not compel 
characters of this description to bear arms." 113 People who would 
"rather die than use [arms]," Boudinot was suggesting, would 
not be very good soldiers. Plus, compelling people to violate their 
consciences would violate principles of "justice." 114 
At the end of the discussion (the rest of which was not 
recorded), the House of Representatives voted to add "in person" 
to the conscientious-objector provision, 115 ensuring that 
conscientious objectors would not have to bear arms but also, by 
implication, accepting that they could be forced to pay an 
equivalent. The Senate later rejected the entire clause, though no 
records survive explaining why. 116 
Only two years later, the topic of equivalents resurfaced 
in debates over a proposed bill to regulate state militias. Again, 
the issue was not exactly compelled subsidies for speech. But the 
payments were to be used in a way that implicated natural rights, 
so they provide the best available evidence of how the members 
of the First Congress viewed mandatory payments that 
potentially abridged First Amendment rights. Once again, the 
leading view was to exempt Quakers from militia service but 
nonetheless require them to pay an equivalent. 
The debate began when Aedanus Burke of South 
Carolina spoke out in favor of exempting Quakers not only from 
militia service but also from any attendant fines or payments for 
non-service. "[I]t was not consonant with the principles of justice 
to make those conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms pay 
for not acting against the voice of their conscience," he 
insisted. 117 Nobody was supposed to "suffer[ ] on account of his 
conscientious scruples," Burke explained, "and yet we are going 
to make a respectable class of citizens pay for a right to a free 
exercise of their religious principles: It was contrary to the 
constitution; it was contrary to that sound policy, which ought 
to direct the house in establishing the militia." 118 
Responding, once again, to the argument against 
equivalents was James Jackson of Georgia. Determining who 
113 Id. at 1309. 
114 Id. 
11s Id. 
116 Mufioz, supra note 49, at 1116. 
117 GEN. ADVERTISER (Phila.), Dec. 23, 1790, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS at 115. 
11s Id. 
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genuinely objected to militia service was a fools errand, he stated: 
"Who was to know ... what persons were really conscientiously 
scrupulous?" If Quakers and others like them were not even 
required to pay an equivalent, Jackson implored, "it was laying 
the axe to the root of all militia." 119 "[O]peration of this 
privilege," he asserted when debate resumed the following day, 
"would ... make the whole community tum Quakers." 120 
But Jackson's argument was deeper. He also emphasized 
the undergirding prinicples "of the social compact." 121 Those 
principles, he noted, required equal treatment as well as 
reciprocal recognition of social duties. Requiring Quakers to pay 
for their non-service, Jackson insisted, was not a special tax on 
their religion. "[I]t is an equivalent for personal service due to 
society .... [A]ll should pay it for the benefit of society; some 
may pay it in personal service-those averse to this mode should 
pay it in money." 122 Jackson, in other words, was arguing against 
equivalents from within the framework of social-contract theory, 
invoking the undergirding principle of impartial treatment. 
Once again, John Vining and Roger Sherman were 
outspoken in favor of religious accommodations. Conscientious 
objectors, Vining argued, could be required to pay a fine "applied 
to a civil use, in which case even the persons scrupulous of 
bearing arms could make no reasonable objection." 123 
Exempting them from militia service while forcing them to pay 
toward militia expenses, however, was "not granting them any 
kind of privilege: it is like inviting them to a splendid banquet, 
and shutting them out; saying 'walk in gentlemen,' and yet 
taking care to keep the door bolted within." 124 Sherman similarly 
argued against forcing Quakers to pay an equivalent toward 
militia costs, proposing instead that Congress might lay a general 
capitation tax that exempted members of the militia, thus 
addressing Jackson's concerns about unequal burdens while also 
accommodating religious objections. 125 Madison stated his 
119 Id. 
120 GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila.), Dec. 29, 1790, reprinted in 14 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791: DEBATES IN 
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: TmRD SESSION, DECEMBER 1790-MARCH 1791 
160 (Charlene B. Bickford et al. eds., 1996). 
121 GEN. ADVERTISER (Phila.), Dec. 24, 1790, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 120, at 123. This is a different 
newspaper report of the same speech by Jackson on December 22, 1790. 
122 Id. at 123. 
123 PENN. PACKET (Phila.), Dec. 28, 1790, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 120, at 141. This, too, is a different 
newspaper report of the debates in the House of Representatives on December 22, 
1790. 
124 Id. 
125 GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila.), Dec. 29, 1790, reprinted in 14 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS at 163. 
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sympathy for this view but-sensing the prevailing mood-
noted that granting religious accommodations without requiring 
an equivalent was politically "impracticable." 126 
Eventually the House decided to leave the issue to the 
discretion of each state rather than set a uniform national rule for 
militia exemptions. 127 But the debate revealed two points 
relevant to compelled subsidies. First, although some 
representatives argued that forcing religious objectors to pay an 
equivalent would violate the Constitution, and others thought 
that not forcing them to pay an equivalent would violate the basic 
terms of the social contract, the dominant view was somewhere 
between these poles. The issue was, in short, understood as one 
within legislative discretion. Certainly nobody suggested that 
judges would step in to decide the matter under the Free Exercise 
Clause. 
Second, although Congress ended up leaving the issue to 
the states, the debate revealed a nuanced perspective on how 
compelled payments might implicate constitutional principles. 
Interestingly, most members of the First Congress who spoke 
treated compelled payments as somehow less offensive to 
religious freedom than compelled militia service, even though 
representatives on both sides of the issue apparently understood 
Quakers to be just as opposed to paying an equivalent as to 
directly serving in the militia. 128 This poses something of a 
puzzle. 
Perhaps some people silently agreed with William Giles 
of Virginia that compelled subsidies were categorically different 
than compelled conduct. "He was in favor of exempting every 
many from doing that, which his general conduct evinced was 
contrary to his conscience," Giles explained, "but it cannot be 
said that it is against the conscience of a Quaker to hold and 
possess property." 129 In other words, because only money was at 
stake, equivalents posed no threat to conscience. (Decades later, 
Massachusetts Justice Thoephilus Parsons famously restated this 
126 Id. at 162; see also id. at 164 ("[Madison] said he should acquiesce in an 
equivalent-tho he would prefer a gratuitous exemption."). 
127 See Militia Act ofl 792, § 2, 1 Stat. 271 (1792) ("[A]ll persons who now are or may 
hereafter be exempted by the laws of the respective states, shall be, and are hereby 
exempted from militia duty .... "). 
128 See, e.g., remarks of James Jackson, DUNLAP'S AM. DAILY ADVERTISER (Phila.), 
Jan. 5, 1791, reprintedin 14DOCUMENTARYHISTORYOFTHEFIRSTFEDERAL 
CONGRESS at 177 ("Quakers ... pray not for exemption only, but to be exempted 
without the payment of an equivalent. It will afford them no redress, nor given them 
any satisfaction."); remarks of Roger Sherman, PENN. PACKET (Phila.), Dec. 31, 
1790, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS at 
149 ("As to their being obliged to pay an equivalent, gentlemen might see that this 
was as disagreeable to their consciences as the other."). 
129 GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila.), Dec. 29, 1790, reprinted in 14 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS at 163. 
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view, writing that a compelled-subsidy claim "seems to mistake 
a man's conscience for his money.") 130 
Yet nobody except Giles articulated such an absolutist 
approach during debates in the First Congress. 131 Most 
representatives, it seems, thought that being forced to pay for 
objectionable activities at least implicated principles of religious 
freedom-even though such compulsion was not categorically 
barred by the First Amendment. Although no speaker explicitly 
resolved this paradox, my suspicion is that the general preference 
for allowing Quakers not to bear arms in person but nonetheless 
requiring payments proceeded from policy-based rationales-
exactly the type of assessments of the general welfare that social-
contract theory demanded. As several members noted, for 
instance, requiring Quakers to pay an equivalent would help 
stem potential problems with fraudulent claims while avoiding 
the counterproductivity of including pacifists in the militia. 132 
In sum, evidence from the First Congress comports with 
the general approach to rights laid out in Part II. Members of the 
House-both in discussing the proposed Second Amendment 
and in later debates over the militia bill-seemed to think both 
that compelled subsidies could at least implicate rights of 
conscience and that those duties were not necessarily violations 
of the First Amendment. 
2. Religious Establishments 
Objections to compelled subsidies for religion could 
easily arise in the context of religious establishments. And, once 
again, the way that the Founders responded to this problem 
reveals a diversity of approaches, bolstering the thesis that the 
Founders had a less categorical or legalistic approach to rights 
than we generally do today. 
Many states guaranteed a right against compelled 
subsidization of religion as part of the state's guarantee of free 
exercise. 133 "[N]o man ought or of right can be compelled to 
attend any religious worship or maintain any ministry contrary 
to or against his own free will and consent," Delaware's 
130 Barnes v. Inhabitants of the First Parish in Falmouth, 6 Mass. (6 Tyng) 401, 408 
(1810); see also Campbell, Religious Neutrality, supra note 46, at 342--43 (discussing the 
Barnes case). 
131 Of course, newspaper reports of congressional proceedings were not necessarily 
comprehensive. 
132 See supra Part III.B.1; GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila.), Aug. 22, 1789, 
reprinted in I I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra 
note 53, at 1308-09. 
133 Many states did not use the term "free exercise," but they each had (in some form) 
a statutory or constitutional guarantee of religious exercise. 
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Declaration of Rights stated. 134 These provlSlons did not 
necessarily disallow religious assessment schemes, but they did 
ensure that opt-out provisions accommodated people who 
preferred not to fund a particular religion. 135 
Some state protections, though, were less generous with 
respect to opt-outs. Georgia and New Hampshire, for instance, 
each protected only a right against compelled subsidization of 
religious instructors of other denominations. 136 Parishoners did 
not have a choice about whether to financially support pastors of 
their own denomination. Meanwhile, Massachusetts permitted 
individuals to earmark their payments for "the support of public 
teacher or teachers of his own religious sect or denomination, 
provided there be any on whose instructions he attends; 
134 Delaware Declaration of Rights of 1776, § 2, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 15 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015); see also N.J. CONST. ofl 776, art. XVIII, 
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 24 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015) ("nor 
shall any Person within this Colony ever be obliged to pay [toward religion] contrary 
to what he believes to be Right, or has deliberately or voluntarily engaged himself to 
perform."); N.C. CONST. of 1776, § XXXIV, reprinted in id. at 29 ("neither shall any 
Person, on any Pretence whatsoever, be compelled to attend any Place of Worship, 
contrary to his own Faith or Judgment; nor be obliged to pay for the purchase of any 
Glebe, or the building of any House of Worship, or for the Maintenance of any 
building of any house of worship, or for the Maintenance of any Minister or 
Ministry, contrary to what he believes right, or has voluntarily and personally 
engaged to perform; but all Persons shall be at Liberty to exercise their own Mode of 
Worship."); PENN. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. II, reprinted in THE 
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 31 (Niel Cogan ed.' 2d ed. 2015) ("[NJ 0 man ought to or 
of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any 
place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own free will 
and consent."); s.c. CONST. of 1778, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 38 
(Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015) ("No Person shall, by Law, be obliged to pay towards 
the Maintenance and Support of a religious Worship that he does not freely join in, 
or has not voluntarily engaged to support."); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I,§ 3, reprinted 
in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 39 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015) ("no Man ought 
or of Right can be compelled to attend any religious Worship, or erect, or support 
any Place of Worship, or maintain any Minister contrary to the Dictates of his 
Conscience."); Virginia Bill for Religious Freedom of 1786, reprinted in THE 
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 48 (Niel Cogan ed.' 2d ed. 2015) ("That no many shall be 
compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place or ministry 
whatsoever."). New York's Constitution guaranteed "free Exercise and Enjoyment 
of religious Profession and Worship" but did not make any statements about 
religious assessments. See N. Y. CONST. of 1 777, art. XXXVIII, reprinted in THE 
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS-25 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015). 
135 See, e.g., Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776, § 33, reprinted in THE COMPLETE 
BILL OF RIGHTS 17 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015) (permitting the legislature to "lay a 
general and equal tax for the support of the Christian religion, leaving to each 
individual the power of appointing the payment over of the money collected from 
him, to the support of any particular place of worship or minister, or for the benefit 
of the poor of his own denomination, or the poor in general of any particular 
county"). 
136 GA. CONST. ofl 777, art. LVI, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 16 (Niel 
Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015); N.H. CONST. of 1783, Part I, Art. VI, reprinted in THE 
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 22 (Niel Cogan ed.' 2d ed. 2015); see also GA. CONST. of 
1789, art. IV,§ 5, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 16 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d 
ed. 2015) ("All persons shall have the free exercise of religion; without being obliged 
to contribute to the support of any religious profession of their own."). 
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otherwise it may be paid toward the support of the teacher or 
teachers of the parish or precinct in which the said monies are 
raised." 137 
Although not always clear, these protections against 
compelled subsidization seem to have been part of-and not 
merely supplementary to-the right of free exercise. Georgia's 
Constitution of 1789, for example, stated that "All persons shall 
have the free exercise of religion; without being obliged to 
contribute to the support of any religious profession of their 
own," indicating that the second clause (against some compelled 
subsidies) clarified the first clause (guaranteeing free exercise). 138 
Once again, Founding Era evidence shows that 
compelled subsidies could implicate not just property rights but 
also rights of conscience, depending on how the money was 
used. State constitutional provisions further point against any 
widespread acceptance of William Giles's argument in the First 
Congress that rights of property were entirely separate from 
rights of conscience. 139 Nonetheless, the diversity among these 
clauses also indicates the lack of any fixed, rigid rule against 
forced subsidization that abridged individual conscience. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is long past time for the Supreme Court to reconsider 
its reliance on Thomas Jefferson's famous statement that "to 
compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the 
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is 
sinful and tyrannical." 140 Not only does evidence from the First 
Congress disprove that the framers of the First Amendment were 
relying on Jefferson but current doctrine is not even consistent 
with his actual views. Plus, modern constitutional interpreters of 
nearly all stripes now focus on some form of original meaning-
not superficial reliance on isolated statements of particularly 
revered "Founding Fathers." As a foundation for modern law, 
the Jeffersonian proposition needs to go. 
137 MASS. CONST. of 1780, Part I, art. III, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 
21 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015). 
138 GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV,§ 5, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 16 
(Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015). Along similar lines, the Delaware Declaration of 
Rights of 1776 coupled the right against compelled subsidization of ministers with a 
right against "be[ing] compelled to attend any religious worship"-a right that 
clearly fell within the scope of the more general guarantee of "the free exercise of 
religious worship" guaranteed in the same provision. Delaware Declaration of Rights 
of 1776, § 2 reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 15 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 
2015). 
139 See Campbell, Religious Neutrality, supra note 46. 
140 JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 545. 
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A broader survey of Founding Era ideas about rights of 
religious and expressive freedom reveals that modem compelled-
subsidy doctrine sits in an uneasy tension with original meaning. 
On the one hand, the Founders generally thought that 
compelling people to furnish money could at least implicate rights 
of conscience. But on the other hand, legal protections against 
compelled subsidies were left almost entirely to legislative 
judgment, without the judicial oversight that defines our modem 
approach to constitutional rights. Looking back to Founding Era 
debates about compelled subsidies thus reinforces an important 
but often neglected point: The Founders understood the entire 
concept of rights very differently than Americans do today. 
